




[2.0] Human beings tend to treat the following animals quite inconsistently.
Pet mice, lab mice, and “pest” mice enjoy wildly different treatments: at
one end of the spectrum, mice are named, cherished, treated like friends
or companions; in the middle, they are handled in batches and anony-
mously yet carefully cared for, and some of them named, before suffering
and dying as experimental subjects; at the other end of the spectrum,
mice are ignored, fended off, busted or destroyed. Most people also be-
lieve domesticated animals are entitled to our assistance in a much larger
range of situations than animals in the wild; among the former, cattle is
normally slaughtered and consumed, while many amongWestern people
would consider eating pets as grossly immoral and tend to consider them
like family. Finally, billions of sentient nonhumans are killed and experi-
mented upon every year for food or research, while few of us, if any,
recommend doing so on any sentient human being.1
[2.1] Advocates of the moral status of nonhuman animals believe that at
least some, if not all, of these practices are wrong, because these animals
have similar interests in virtue of their physiological and psychological
capacities to have various sorts of experience. But what are the relevant
similarities between these animals that make it wrong to treat them dif-
ferently? Aren’t there any relevant differences that equally make it per-
missible to treat them differently aside from their capacities?
[2.2] In this chapter I challenge a widespread, if tacit, assumption of animal
ethics—namely, that the only properties of entities that matter to their
moral status are intrinsic properties (typically psychological or cognitive
capacities such as sentience or consciousness) that are independent of
their context, species or relations. This view is sometimes called moral
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individualism.2 The rejection of speciesism has long relied on the so-called
Argument from Marginal Cases,3 which points to the absence of intrinsic
morally relevant differences between infants, comatose, senile or severely
mentally impaired humans on the one hand, and nonhuman animals
with allegedly comparable capacities on the other hand, to argue that our
speciesist practices are inconsistent. Accordingly, relationships, arbitrary
group memberships (gender, race, species nations), and emotional or
spatial distance have become unreliable moral standards.
[2.3]Moral individualism, McMahan writes, “is a thesis about the justifica-
tion of judgments concerning how individuals may be treated. The basic
idea is that how an individual may be treated is determined, not by
considering his group memberships, but by considering his own particu-
lar characteristics”.4 So construed, moral individualism has been taken
for granted by most “animal rights” theorists—consequentialists,5 rights
theorists,6 contractarians,7 capabilities theorists8 —in their search for mo-
rally enfranchising characteristics.
[2.4]Disputes about the relevance of relations such as love and affection, or
species membership, are actually as old as animal ethics. So-called Sing-
er-Regan theories have long been opposed on this ground.9 Indeed,
many accounts of our obligations to animals have focused on, or made
room for, some relationships.10 For instance, Wittgensteinians and care
ethicists have challenged moral individualism, whether or not they call it
so, arguing instead for the importance of nonbiological ideas such as
“fellow creatures”,11 “being human”,12 “an animal”,13 or “some mother’s
child”.14 Below, I will use the very concepts of mainstream animal ethics
to undermine the default assumption that moral individualism lays bare.
[2.5]Although these debates may seem well worn, capacities and relations
have too often been understood as mutually exclusive, the notion of what
counts as “morally arbitrary” too often taken for granted by moral indi-
vidualists, and the relevance of relationships too loosely related to moral
status by critics. My goal here is twofold: pinpointing the specific as-
sumptions underlying the denial of morally relevant relationships and
highlighting the compatibility of the latter with a genuine account of
moral status. I will argue that, while it is true that some intrinsic capac-
ities central to flourishing are fundamentally relevant, the principled ex-
clusion of extrinsic properties (in virtue of their “extrinsicness”) is un-
warranted, some relations are relevant to some obligations, and such
obligations are a part of an animal’s status. The argument rests on an
analysis of moral status in terms of supervenience, final value and the
connection between value and obligations. In section 1, I explain further
what moral individualism is. In section 2, I spell out my analysis of moral
status and address the assumption, which I will label intrinsicalism. The
negative part of the argument, here, is that the assumption is not implied
by a plausible analysis of moral status. In section 3, I build a positive case
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for the relevance of extrinsic properties to moral status based on vulner-
ability and on the reasonableness of partiality.
[2.6] MORAL INDIVIDUALISM
[2.7] The motivation for the focus on intrinsic properties is understandable.
Consider Lori Gruen’s apt reminder:
[2.8] Extrinsic considerations such as popularity, usefulness to others, politi-
cal expediency, and social prejudice can be set aside. . . . No one should
be denied the possibility of exercising their capacities and satisfying
their interests simply because of inegalitarian social conventions or dis-
criminatory traditions. These sorts of relational properties have a long
history of being used to exclude members of “out” groups, and appeals
to such relational properties have led to ethically unacceptable prac-
tices and policies.15
[2.9] Moral individualism is a formal, or metanormative, rather than a sub-
stantive, thesis about our obligations. Basically, it is a requirement of
impartiality across relevantly comparable individuals. It is based upon
three central claims: (1) the moral status of an individual is a normative
consideration for all agents; (2) moral status is an agent-neutral consider-
ation; (3) extrinsic properties cannot be the basis for agent-neutral rea-
sons. Hence, insofar as relations provide only agent-neutral reasons, they
cannot ground moral status.
[2.10] The notion of moral status is central to both animal ethics overall and
moral individualism.16 A “status-conferring intrinsic property”, accord-
ing to McMahan, is “a property that gives its possessor a moral status
that is a source of ‘agent-neutral’ reasons”.17 Properties that qualify as
status conferring may be sentience,18 being a “subject-of-a-life”,19 vari-
able sets of cognitive abilities,20 central capabilities,21 or, for those who
tend to deny animals direct moral standing, higher-order conscious-
ness,22 language23 and rational agency.24
[2.11] While McMahan acknowledges that some special relationships (e.g.,
this child being’s my child) may provide significant reasons,25 such rea-
sons, he claims, are merely agent-relative. Agent-neutral reasons, in
contrast, arise from intrinsic properties and normally trump the former.
He writes, “It is foundational to . . . moral individualism that . . . only
intrinsic properties can be status-conferring and give rise to agent-neutral
moral reasons”.26 Let me call intrinsicalism this “foundational” assump-
tion of moral individualism. This assumption, I will argue, is not uncon-
troversial. For instance, Elizabeth Anderson writes that “[m]oral consid-
erability is not an intrinsic property of any creature, nor is it supervenient
on only its intrinsic properties, such as its capacities. It depends, deeply,
on the kind of relations they [e.g., an individual with severe Alzheimer’s]
can have with us”,27 while Ronald Sandler remarks that “something
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might, owing to its particular history, be due gratitude and loyalty,
whereas a like entity with a different history is not due these. Thus,
morally considerable entities can have different (and multiple) types of
moral status”.28 I want to build on these insights to strengthen and for-
malize the links between extrinsic properties and moral status.
[2.12]Consider two animals with roughly comparable psychological capac-
ities (say, the same levels of sentiency or cognitive capacities such as
memory, self-awareness, empathy, etc.). Consider now that two such in-
dividuals have different relational properties insofar as they may serve
different purposes, or be bonded to human agents through affection or
proximity. The question is: Are some of those relational properties moral-
ly relevant too? According to proponents of moral individualism, the
answer is no, and to think otherwise an agent must be confused by irrele-
vant factors such as species bias, economic profit, emotional bonds or
other forms of cognitive or sociological biases. Thus, McMahan writes:
[2.13]A rough guide to what we owe to animals is this: we owe to them
whatever kind of treatment we believe the severely retarded would be
owed in virtue of their intrinsic natures by morally sensitive Martians.
We should, in short, treat animals no worse than we believe severely
retarded human beings with comparable capacities should be treated
by moral agents who are not specially related to them. 29
[2.14]As Anderson writes, “In this individualistic framework individuals
must earn entitlements on their own merits, independently of their mem-
bership in generally meritorious groups”. In sum, biological comember-
ship is morally irrelevant (species, gender, race), while nonbiological co-
membership is associative and accordingly either merely agent-relative
(family, friends, fellow citizens) or morally insignificant (wealth, social or
geographical origin, religion, sexual orientation).30
[2.15]McMahan’s view is typical of other proponents of moral individual-
ism who do not defend the basic assumption that only intrinsic proper-
ties matter; instead, the significance of properties is invoked to argue
against relational views. The very claim that intrinsic properties are what
matters is never directly addressed. But it does not follow from the irrele-
vance of some relational properties that all relational properties are irrel-
evant to considerations of moral status. It may be that when the full
gamut of relational properties are laid bare then there will be some that
have a bearing upon moral status, that some extrinsic features of an indi-
vidual are relevant to the individual herself, or to moral agents, in a
fashion that affects moral status. I believe vulnerability is one such rela-
tional property, and that reasonable partiality provides another source of
extrinsic value relevant to status, but before I proceed to argue for the
relevance of such extrinsic properties, I need to posit some machinery.
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[2.16] MORAL STATUS DOES NOT IMPLY INTRINSICALISM
[2.17] A common understanding of moral properties (e.g., value) is that they
“supervene” on natural properties, such as the capacities of animals em-
phasized so far. According to a standard definition, a class of properties B
supervenes on a class A just when, necessarily, if x and y are A-indiscernible,
they are B-indiscernible. That is, no B-difference without an A-difference.
Supervenient properties (e.g., mental, aesthetic, moral) are said to super-
vene on base properties (e.g., physical, natural). The supervenience rela-
tion provides a framework to illuminate standards of consistency and
universalization in moral reasoning, whereby like individuals in relevant
respects ought to be treated alike.
[2.18] Importantly, the same relation can apply to supervenience on nonin-
trinsic properties. Suppose R is one (and the only) morally relevant rela-
tion among a given set of individuals:31 if x and y are indiscernible in respect
of their one-place nonmoral properties, if x and y are discernible in respect of
their moral properties, then they must be R-discernible. It is compatible with
the form of justification (because) we expect when reasoning about moral
differences. If this is correct, then, taking account of relationships need
not preclude the admittedly essential standards expressed by the super-
venience relation.
[2.19] Moral status is among the moral properties an entity can have. Moral-
ly considerable entities, writes Mark Bernstein, are those “toward whom
moral behaviors can be intelligibly addressed”.32 But considerability is
only a first step to determinate status. It is a threshold and range concept:
it applies equally to all those that meet a given criterion above a given
threshold. In a classic definition, Mary AnnWarren writes:
[2.20] To have moral status is to be morally considerable, or to have moral
standing. It is to be an entity toward which moral agents have, or can
have, moral obligations. If an entity has moral status, then we may not
treat it in just any way we please; we are morally obliged to give
weight in our deliberations to its needs, interests, or well-being. Fur-
thermore, we are morally obliged to do this not merely because protect-
ing it may benefit ourselves or other persons, but because its needs
have moral importance in their own right.33
[2.21] Three points are worth emphasizing. First, Warren is concerned with
directmoral status, which entities have “in their own right” rather than in
virtue of the status of other entities to which they may be related. For
instance, a pig with direct moral status does not matter simply as a piece
of livestock with instrumental value; he matters because he has needs
and interests. Insofar as one is dealing with direct status, failing to per-
form one’s duties wrongs the entity itself; duties are owed to the entity
itself rather than to some other being with moral status or merely with
regard to the entity (i.e., indirect duties). This is because only entities with
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“needs, interests, or well-being” (those for which things can go well or ill,
better or worse, those which can be benefited or harmed) can have status.
As Elizabeth Harman writes:
[2.22]A harm to a being “matters morally” just in case there is a reason not to
perform any action that would cause the harm and the reason exists
simply in virtue of its being a harm to that thing, and simply in virtue
of the badness of the harm for that thing. A thing has moral status just
in case harms to it matter morally.34
[2.23]Following this account of moral harm, moral status derives from the
importance of harms, which is a function of their badness for the entity. The
moral individualist might then infer: an entity’s status is strictly a func-
tion of its cognitive capacities. But note that this account does not rule out
something’s badness-for a being arising from nonintrinsic factors, such as
the being’s environment, relationships or others’ expectations and atti-
tudes. For instance, suppose our “nearest and dearest” give us stronger
reasons than others; there may be corresponding claims that these indi-
viduals make on us. Thus, failing to meet their expectations is bad for
them and makes them worse off in a distinctive way. Others do not have
similar claims, and our failing to do unto them as we ought to do unto
others is a different sort of harm. I will revert to such cases later. If they
are plausible, then Harman’s conditions for moral harms remain compat-
ible with a broader basis for status.
[2.24]Second, Warren conceives of moral status as “a tool”, “a means of
specifying those entities towards which we believe ourselves to have
moral obligations, as well as something of what we take those obligations
to be”.35 Moral status is not so much world guided (a reflection of entities’
natures) as action guiding (constraining our responses to their natures).
Moral status, in other words, has a function. It provides agents with rea-
sons for action. It has this function insofar as it works as a placeholder,
covering the bundle of our obligations towards its bearer.36 When consid-
ering a given entity, it ought to be sufficiently clear that its status affords
reasons to treat it in certain ways rather than others. It ought to be a
salient component of a pig’s status that, and why, kicking him in the
head, beating him with an iron stick, castrating him without anesthesia as
a piglet, or not providing for his complex social needs harm him. And it
ought to be at least epistemically accessible to the agent why this is so—
because the pig is sentient, has a complex emotional life, flourishes in a
complex social environment, revels in play, foraging, mud cooling, and
so on. It ought to be clear, in other words, that the pig has his status in
virtue of his characteristics.
[2.25]Third, moral status has a specific axiological underpinning. If some-
thing has status, then it is meaningful to say that it is valuable, and the
way we value something that has status is, typically, in Kantian terms, as
an end rather than as a mere means. Final valuing is thus built into the
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concept of moral status, as opposed to instrumental valuing. This differ-
ence parallels, to some extent, the difference between direct and indirect
moral status. Hence, I believe, moral status implies final value.37 The
phrase in their own right in Warren’s definition is a mark of final value.
When we perform our duties directly to the pig, because he has moral
status, we take him into account “for his own sake”—not instrumentally
or for the sake of anything else. As Warren notes, something cannot have
direct moral status if it matters only because the way we treat it affects
another entity’s well-being, or because we value something external, to
whose value it contributes. For instance, breaking a vase harms the own-
er, not the vase, whereas kicking a pig harms the pig, not only or primari-
ly his owner.
[2.26] Final value is (1) nonderivative (i.e., not derived from the value of
something else) and (2) noncontributory (i.e., its bearer is not valuable
merely as a part of a valuable whole). (1) A finally valued object is there-
fore the primary bearer of value, from which other objects derive their
secondary (that is, instrumental) value. For instance, the value of a tool
derives from the value of what it helps one achieve; the value of a biologi-
cal species, from an “animal rights” perspective, derives from the value
of its individual members. (2) Animal rights theorists, broadly construed,
believe animals are not valuable merely in virtue of the species they
belong to, while environmentalists typically believe natural wholes have
final value, to which individual parts contribute.
[2.27] Final value can apply to a variety of objects: human and nonhuman
animals, natural wholes, biological species, artworks, monuments. How-
ever, writing on the concept of moral status, Frances Kamm marks a
distinction between entities counting in their own right (e.g., a painting)
and those for whose sake (i.e., welfare) we can act (e.g., a bird).38 And
having a sake seems required for having moral status in the relevant
sense, even though morality also pertains to things and acts that are
finally valuable but lack moral status. Artworks, monuments, precious
artefacts and natural wholes can count noninstrumentally, but they can-
not be harmed; rather, they can be hurt, damaged, destroyed, or caused
to disappear.39 Nothing is owed to Leonardo’s Mona Lisa, the Parthenon,
or the Grand Canyon, even though we ought, plausibly, not to treat them
as mere means or dispensable commodities.
[2.28] The latter distinction is important because it is highly plausible that
final value can supervene on extrinsic properties (being rare or precious,
having a historical or symbolic role),40 including the value of natural
entities such as rare specimens, endangered or fragile species or ecosys-
tems, unique landscapes, forests or canyons.41 If final value implied mo-
ral status, my claim would be easily supported: entities whose value
supervenes at least in part on their extrinsic properties would have moral
status. And provided, as is likely, that moral status and final value de-
pend on the same properties, such entities would also have moral status
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based on their extrinsic properties. However, final value does not imply
moral status, and I still need to substantiate the claim that they both
depend on the same properties among a given entity’s properties.
[2.29]The first step in the argument is: final value can supervene on extrin-
sic properties. Concrete objects or events can have final value in virtue of
their uniqueness, rarity or history, such as athletic records, biological
species, landscapes or ecosystems, national monuments, artworks, pre-
cious artefacts, delicacies, and more. But this is also true of some entities
that qualify for moral status. People (e.g., friends, lovers, children) and
other animals (pets, certain zoo, lab, work or wild specimens) can have
special final value in virtue of special relationships to valuers (shared
history or commitments, being unique, parental or other special respon-
sibilities). That is, final value can supervene on properties that two intrin-
sically similar entities, or duplicates, need not share. Now, there remains
to be shown that their moral status depends on such properties.
[2.30]First, note that this special sort of value certainly provides some
agents with additional reasons and likely generates additional duties of
care and assistance. Yet moral individualists would remark, such reasons
and duties are merely agent-relative—that is, they bind only the partici-
pants in the relationships. My cat makes stronger claims on me than on
other cats, and other people. If my cat has moral status, then the specific
responses and attitudes (e.g., care) that her value warrants and calls for
are based on precisely those features of hers on which my obligations to
her are based. Thus, I finally value my cat in a distinctive way in virtue of
the features that entitle her to specific treatment. These features may
include: her being my cat, the fact that I rescued and adopted her, my
responsibility in her present situation, her dependency, and so on.
[2.31]Even responding appropriately to specially finally valuable things
such as a painting of Vermeer’s or the California redwoods—the value of
which is based in part on the fact that such things are not related to the
world like intrinsically similar things—involves the recognition of signifi-
cant agent-neutral constraints against damaging, destroying or replacing
them for the sake of other things. And these constraints stem from the
relational properties of those things. With respect to such entities, there-
fore, valuing comes closely tied with actions required by the properties
that ground value (rarity, uniqueness, majesty, history, etc.).
[2.32]When it comes to the special final value of my cat or my child, howev-
er, more fine-tuning is required to show that such value leads to special
status in the agent-neutral sense. For one thing, reasons not to harm any
child are surely agent-neutral, but they are also independent of a child’s
relational properties; on the other hand, our own children yield mainly
agent-relative reasons, as remarked above. Still, overlooked by the moral
individualist is the fact that any parent’s ability to provide for her chil-
dren critically depends on a wider context of institutions, schools, health
care, family and social support and, crucially, anybody’s and society’s
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recognition that parents are allowed and obliged to care first and fore-
most for their children’s essential needs. Hence, on the top of agent-
relative constraints, special relationships generate agent-neutral, second-
order reasons to enable people to act upon their reasonable agent-relative
reasons. Now, the obligations that relate to these reasons are not merely
owed to the ones taking care, they are also owed to the ones cared for.
The next section will elaborate on this claim.
[2.33] MORAL STATUS, PARTIALITY AND VULNERABILITY
[2.34] Moral status has an irreducibly relational component but still involves
agent-neutral considerations. Thus, my view differs, on the one hand,
from purely relational, contractarian accounts of status according to
which status can, in principle, be reduced to any given pair of individuals
bound by possibly asymmetrical moral considerations, such as my
friend’s status to me.42 On the other hand, it differs from individualist
views according to which relationships cannot bear on moral status since
they are merely agent-relative. Finally, my view is not simply that rela-
tionships matter in addition to, or instead of, moral status based on ca-
pacities; I show how moral status breaks down into two distinct but
possibly interacting components. And now for the positive argument.
[2.35] Agent-neutral reasons for status based on extrinsic properties, I be-
lieve, have two main sources: (1) the “reasonable” character of partiality
and special relationships; (2) vulnerability. First consider “reasonable
partiality”. This is the view that agents may appeal to agent-relative “re-
strictions” and “prerogatives”,43 or are allowed to give priority to their
own good, or the good of their “near and dear”. Special relationships
such as love, friendship, family, expectations generated by shared com-
mitments and projects can ground partiality, the reasonableness of which
is grounded in the contribution of special relationships to the flourishing
of all those who partake in them. This much has been widely acknowl-
edged by a variety of authors,44 including with respect to pet keeping
and domesticated animals overall.45 Even consequentialists have ac-
knowledged indirect, impartiality-based reasons to allow for a degree of
partiality in human undertakings and cares so as to address the “nearest
and dearest” objection, and to the extent that partiality has optimal con-
sequences overall.46 To my knowledge, however, none has noticed how
such considerations bear on direct moral status, as analysed in this chap-
ter, and emphasized the relevance of extrinsic final value.
[2.36] Regarding pets, an indirect case for partiality can be rested on max-
imizing utility: absolute impartiality would require people to give up on
some of their most significant commitments and attachments, it would
deprive them of valuable experiences, would, at least until extinction,
make millions of animals worse off than they would be under the prac-
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tice of pet keeping. This is, in a nutshell, what motivates the consequen-
tialist response to the “nearest and dearest” objection. But the case can
also be made on the basis of direct considerations. Insofar as reasonable
partiality is justified, pets provide their caretakers with agent-relative
reasons to care for them more than they care for other animals. But the
final value of the pet to her related caretaker is justified precisely in virtue
of the fact that the relationship instantiates a finally valuable aspect of
human and nonhuman lives. My cat and I—or cats and people in gener-
al—can benefit from the multispecies community they give rise to,47 with
all the particular features of each relationship (uniqueness, shared histo-
ry, past commitments) resonating in a distinctive way with the general
features of the typical pet-human relationship. Insofar as caretakers have
special obligations to their pets, and as anyone has some obligations not
to disregard, impede, or interfere with the relationships giving rise to
them, the caretaker’s failure to specially care for her pet wrongs the pet—
which anyone ought to recognize and has reasons to prevent, or at least
regret or blame.
[2.37]Finally, note that reasonableness is essential. For radical partiality
would allow one to discount an animal’s status according to morally
irrelevant factors such as disgust, comfort or self-interest. For instance,
being a “pest” is a relational property, but intrinsic capacities matter too.
In hard cases, conflicts of interest must be settled with due consideration
of all relevant factors, not just one’s negative partiality towards certain
groups.
[2.38]Consider now the concept of vulnerability. One explanation for the
special wrongness of harming vulnerable beings lies in the extrinsic dis-
position of vulnerability. Children and domesticated animals plausibly
have different rights than their adult or wild counterparts, respectively,
either because of a lesser degree of autonomy (regarding, for example,
voting) or as a means of protection (regarding, for example, driving),
though the diminished capacities that account for this fact also account
for the increased protection they deserve when children or domesticated
animals cannot fend for themselves. The special status of children and
domesticated animals is therefore based on both intrinsic properties (their
actual capacities) and extrinsic properties (vulnerability, dependency).
[2.39]To be vulnerable means to be able to be harmed in a certain context.
Jennifer McKitrick has convincingly shown that dispositions are not nec-
essarily intrinsic.48 Among examples of extrinsic dispositions, she cites
weight, visibility or vulnerability. An intrinsic disposition is shared by
perfect duplicates (e.g., the fragility of a vase, grounded in its internal
physical properties), and its manifestation (breaking) depends on given
circumstances (e.g., being struck), whereas an extrinsic disposition is not
shared by perfect duplicates since the circumstances of its manifestation
can vary if the environment changes (e.g., disability or vulnerability are a
function of how context allows individuals to achieve some of their goals
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or avoid being harmed). Importantly, vulnerability is a central feature of
most domesticated animals, especially farm and research animals that
have been specifically designed to remain dependent and sometimes vul-
nerable to specific harms (e.g., cancer for the infamous Harvard Onco-
mouse).49 More straightforwardly than partiality, vulnerability generates
agent-neutral reasons to protect the vulnerable. Protection is owed direct-
ly to them, hence the corresponding obligation is based on extrinsic prop-
erties. Hence, at least part of their moral status depends on their extrinsic
properties. Plus, insofar as attending to vulnerability implies special care
and related attitudes, it implies recognition of a special kind of value:
vulnerable beings, unlike intrinsic duplicates, are those by the sake of
which our protection ought to be directed. Again, there is an internal
relation between valuing and acting as status requires, which shows that
wherever there is moral status and special final value, there is special
moral status, since value and status depend on the same properties. More
accurately, value supervenes on an entity’s morally relevant properties,
including sometimes her extrinsic properties, and determines the kind of
status that it has in virtue of those very properties.
[2.40] CONCLUSION
[2.41] Moral status, I pointed out at the onset, is not the whole truth about
moral obligations. Warren writes:
[2.42] Many of our obligations are based not only upon the moral status of
those towards whom we are obliged, but also upon situational factors,
such as a promise we have made, a personal relationship in which we
are involved, a civil or criminal law that has been justly enacted, or a
wrongful past action of our own that requires restitution or compensa-
tion.50
[2.43] As I showed, however, obligations are not strictly speaking “based
upon” status; status consists in certain obligations. And obligations based
on personal relationships are among such obligations insofar as they bind
agents beyond those involved in such relationships.
[2.44] From widely shared starting points, I explicated moral status in terms
of supervenience, final value and direct obligations; then, I linked the
possibility of extrinsic, or special, final value with moral status to show
that the latter can depend on extrinsic properties; finally, I offered two
sorts of relational properties on which special final value supervenes,
which in turns determines special status. In sum, animals to which we are
specially related have a twofold special status: one is agent-neutral (vul-
nerability), another is agent-relative but binds all agents in an agent-
neutral way (partiality).51 This status consists in duties directly owed to
the animal, and each of its aspect is based on an extrinsic property on
which a distinctive final value supervenes. Contra moral individualism,
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some extrinsic properties give rise to agent-neutral reasons. Following a
plausible analysis of moral status, such reasons bear on moral status.
Hence, moral status is not a mere function of capacities, along with separ-
ate, additional obligations; instead, moral status is best understood as a
(variable) set of obligations depending on capacities and context, yet
binding agent-neutrally, thus meeting both requirements of relational ac-
counts and those of impartiality but captured by the idea of the super-
venience of final value on extrinsic properties.
[2.45]At the beginning of the third section above, I claimed that the intrinsic
and extrinsic components of moral status possibly interact. By this I mean
two things: first, capacities affect what relationships one can take part in,
or what harms one is vulnerable to; second, that which morally relevant
capacities typically support—for example, needs and expectations—can
also be affected (e.g., strengthened) by context (e.g., domestication). This
dual-source status is therefore compatible with impartiality since intrinsi-
cally comparable animals can still have different expectations and inter-
ests depending on context.
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